Clash of Polarities

2010_10_10 The Clash of Polarities

Because I just finished reading OBAMA’S WAR, the latest reportorial opus by the savant Bob Woodward, I feel compelled to make a few comments. The text focuses on the intense discussions held a year ago in regard the war in Afghanistan. It was a kind of seminar called for by Professor Obama that resulted in an executive White Paper. I found the book a tough read; maybe it is exciting for wonks and political junkies, but it was a grind for me. It was an old story told anew, about the bickering that always seems to occur in the midst of wartime, as the military brain trust pit themselves against Team Obama composed of a civilian cadre dug in and determined to fend off the pushy Team Generals. The Generals seek to get the civilians out of the way before they hurt themselves—or make peace on their own or too quickly. Since they feel better trained and equipped to handle war in all its aspects, they are best qualified to make THE BIG DECISSIONS ABOUT THE CONDUCT OF OBAMA’S WAR. So went their thinking. They were, after all, the professionals in this scenario. Especially in this case, as the president, as most people would agree, is a raw rookie in this circumstance. In the final analysis, the long series of discussions were bound to not be successful because they never had a real chance to be. It was all a formal exercise, like war games, or a game of bureaucratic one-upmanship, the military pressing hard against Team Obama with Team Obama pushing back as hard as they could, and with equal passion, with Obama and people like Gen. James Jones hanging in a middle zone between the clashing perspectives.

Jim Jones was in the news yesterday. He resigned his post as NSA Director, effective in two weeks. He got out four months before he had originally planned to which was at 24 month’s service. Personally, I think the post was a grind for him too, but in a different way: it was an impossible balancing act over an abyss called “failure,” a fear that existed on every level for every faction in this THE GREAT DEBATE. Poor Jones, he had a boot in two worlds. He was, on one hand, the well-intentioned advocate for POTUS (that’s military-speak for President Obama of the United States) while on the other hand, he was a retired General mindful of the concerns and goals of his old pals in the Pentagon and Defense Dept. In a futile attempt to please both sides he ended up paralyzed by the polarization in his own head so he decided to run for the hills. He had had enough of the big squeeze. But last night I read a section in OBAMA’S WAR where Jones had said that it would be a “disaster” if his Chief Deputy, Tom Donilon, was his replacement, which was exactly what happened yesterday. Donilon is one of those long-lived loyal Democrats who have found various posts since Bill Clinton was in the Oval Office. It is true he is far removed from the space the General came from. Calling him a “disaster” could simply mean he is more a team player than Jones was.

The book describes the uneven dialogue among the civilian leaders who make the Big Decisions, meaning Team Obama going head to head with Team Generals who were actually doing most of the talking because the president had asked them to set the agenda. Team Obama was in the position of counter-puncher, a role they seemed to be adjusting to. The clique of Generals saw themselves as more knowledgeable and savvy in the world of war. Most of the book deals with this tug of war between the thinkers vs. the doers, the president vs. the hawks, the Democrats vs. the Republicans, McCain vs. Biden, and blue eyes vs. brown eyes. By the way, Biden worked hard to keep Obama above water—not overwhelmed by the clique of Generals. They ended up respecting his intellectual acuity.

While the military always goes for the gold, victory, it is an unrealistic goal in Afghanistan, which is notorious as the “graveyard of Empires.” The American people are not going to accept what it would take to wrap up a win in Afghanistan. It would take a decade at least and might take 20 years. It would also be very expensive. The Generals estimated $113 billion a year. That’s a lot of money going down a rat hole when millions of people are unemployed and our infrastructures keeps decaying. Things cry out for attention but the war goes on and on, like a bad habit. Yesterday marked the first day of the 10th year of the war. The public is already dubious about staying in this fight, at least how it is currently framed and mounted. And it’s obvious we are nowhere near a foothold there, much less close to a satisfactory ending to the conflict. President Karzai is another big problem: he is incapable of good governance. He has, for the Americans who have to deal with him, the stature of small town mayor. He is a serious roadblock to the progress called for. Another big problem is Pakistan which was and still is double-dealing with us: they take our money and funnel part of it to the Taliban who are supposed to be the enemy.

Aside from the clashing of opinions, Obama had hoped for a plan of action that would be of use to him in an ongoing fashion. Ultimately what the generals wanted was, as General McChrystal put it, “a fully resourced counterinsurgency” that would be open-ended with no exit plan and the right to attack the “the safe havens in Pakistan.” Big Mac wanted 100,000 troops there for 10 years. It’s strange how these military geniuses can expect their outrageous demand to be simply agreed to and provided for. Wars or potential wars are always more of a priority than domestic problems at home. They don’t seem to have a good grasp of what it is like for a lot of people. They lack a sense of proportion which makes them look self-indulgent to an extreme degree. But the President’s Final Oder called for “degrading the Taliban,” not defeating them; to encourage the capacity of Afghan forces so we can drawdown our troops by July 2011; the addition of 30,000 troops (rather than 40,000); it was acceptable to hit those safe havens in Pakistan; and the cost of being there would be $113 billion a year. The problem of President Karzai was put on the back burner for another day and he is still a fly in the ointment. The Generals wanted more troops, more money and more power. Obama was their intellectual equal and had the will power to hold firm on some basic principles, keeping them on a short leash, with the civilian component of our government doing, all things considered, pretty well. The Generals huffed and they puffed but could not blow the civilians away.

And of course Gen. Stan McChrystal is long gone committing professional suicide by being flippant with his remarks when being interviewed by a journalist from Rolling Stone about the president and other members of Team Obama. The next logical choice took his place, Gen. David Patraeus. The book about these two leading lights of the military establishment has yet to be written.